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Abstract 
The overarching aim of this study is to gain understanding on what major state-
centric international relations-theory could best explain certain aspects on modern 
inter-state maritime disputes. From neorealist and neoliberalist schools of thought 
an operational schematic was formed as a theoretical ram to break down and 
explain underlying structures in instances of the empirical data-universe, which 
consisted of interstate dealings between China, Vietnam and The Philippines 
regarding the contested territory of The Spratly Islands. The result was then put in 
comparison to distinguish which, if any conclusions could be drawn. Due to the 
highly limited scope and material of the study, some of the results could be put 
under scrutiny for being somewhat sparsely researched, while others could be 
expected to carry a fairly high validity. Mainly that of the neorealist school of 
thoughts high impact on state actions in the region. The study shows a staggering 
majority of neorealist markers in the actions taken by aforementioned actors, thus 
solidifying neorealism as the major theory. 
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1 South China Sea – A contested area 
The South China Sea is today a hotbed of interstate activity. Due to its strategic 
location for shipping lanes, its highly complex stretches of territorial borders, the 
huge fishing industry in the region and the belief that underneath the seabed there 
might be uncountable riches in oil and other valuable minerals, several of the 
states bordering the South China Sea all lay claims to contested islands and the 
surrounding territorial waters.  
The South China Sea consists of an area roughly the size of India, containing 
more than 250 islands and atolls with several thousand further islets, reefs and 
shoals, divided into five island-groups or archipelagos with The Spratly Islands 
and The Parcel Islands being the main ones (CIA 1, 2014). The islands are for the 
most part uninhabited and in many cases no more than reefs with little significant 
value of its own. The surrounding waters and the seabed however, is another 
matter, with potentially huge natural resource deposits. The South China Sea 
covers what is known as a continental shelf. A continental shelf is the seabed 
beneath a body of water which is an extension of the continental landmass giving 
it shallow waters (UN 1, 1982, Art. 76). How to divide this type of maritime 
territory is statutorily defined in the United Nations Convention on the Law Of the 
Sea (UNCLOS). Since this convention serve as a basis for much of the events this 
study aims to research, and is fairly technical, the paper has opted to include a 
more extensive section on it farther along in the study. 
1.1 Background and brief history 
Historically, the territory has seen much dispute, dating back several hundred 
years, making the disputes of today highly infected with historical prejudice and 
rich in context. The many islands and their adjacent territorial waters have in 
different historical times belonged to, or been claimed by; the Republic of China, 
Vietnam, Germany, France, Spain, the United States of America, and during 
World War II – Japan (Tønneson, 2002, pp.6). 
After the second world war, the South China Sea experienced a power vacuum 
due in large to the defeat and withdrawal of The Empire of Japan, who in the early 
1950‟s renounced their territorial claims to the area. This led to an increasing 
power struggle between the states immediately bordering the ocean. China had, 
with the signing of the peace accord with Japan, seized control over The Parcel 
and The Spratly Islands and effectively bit off a large chunk of the South China 
Sea far from traditional Chinese territorial waters, claiming historical ownership 
and published a map showing what came to be known as the nine-segment line of 
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the South China Sea. This line would encompass large amounts of the South 
China Sea with most of the islands and functions as Chinas claim to the area. With 
the fall of the Republic of China and its subsequent withdrawal to Taiwan, the 
Philippines stepped up to the plate and laid claim to the Spratly Islands, but was 
after a few years uprooted by returning Republic of China forces. France 
withdrew their claims after the expulsion from Vietnam but in its stead South 
Vietnam took over the claim while North Vietnam supported Chinese claims as 
part of their allegiance. After the North Vietnam victory in the Vietnam War, they 
withdrew their support to the Chinese claims and made claims of their own to 
both archipelagos. During this time the Philippines had once again made a bold 
move and occupied and laid claims to several Spratly Islands close to their 
mainland (ibid.). Furthermore Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan and Indonesia have made 
various claims to both islands and territorial waters in The South China Sea. 
In 2002 the ASEAN-states (Association of SouthEast Asian Nations, with 
South China Sea members; Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and the 
Philippines) signed a code of conduct accord with China regarding state behavior 
in the South China Sea. In this agreement they affirm their intention to let 
international law, such as the UNCLOS (see details further down) to serve as a 
basis for solving disputes and they reiterate that no force or threat of force will be 
used in maritime disputes (ASEAN 1, 2002). This study aims to examine to what 
extent this accord has been followed by examining events between certain states 
in this region. 
1.2 Focus of the study – The Spratly Islands 
Due to the limited extent of this study I 
have chosen to focus the scope of my 
inquiries to only include events regarding 
the Spratly Islands (picture 1). I chose the 
Spratly islands mainly because of its 
highly contested nature and complexity 
in ownership.  
The Spratly islands consists of more 
than 700 small formations, many which 
are only coral reefs, and surrounding 
waters of almost 410 000 km
2
 (CIA 1, 
2014) In the surrounding seabed 
estimations of hydrocarbon deposits 
surpassing 17 billion tons have been 
made by Chinese prospectors. The figures might be seen as somewhat optimistic 
though and western geological experts estimate the number to be significantly 
less, yet still worth a substantial amount. However, if the Chinese numbers are 
accurate the Spratly Islands could be the fourth largest known oil-field in the 
world (EIA 1). 
Picture 1 
  3 
The vast majority of the formations are not inhabited or occupied, but of the 
larger islands several are occupied by forces from China (PRC), Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Malaysia and the Republic of China. Vietnam is the state which has 
the highest number of islands under its control, holding more than half of the total 
number of occupied islands (CIA 1, 2014). The occupation in most cases does not 
follow clear borders but is instead often comingled in the sense that states occupy 
islands on either side of each other; this situation alone creates a sprouting ground 
for conflict. Add to it the prospect of large deposits of oil, gas and other natural 
resources in the vicinity of the islands and you get the recipe for a powder keg 
waiting to either explode or be diffused by multilateral cooperation.  
To further limit the scope of the study in this vastly complex environment 
research will be narrowed further by only examining events taking place between 
three of the states claiming control of the area, China (PRC), Vietnam and the 
Philippines. Below follows the reasoning in choosing these three states together 
with a short state by state comparison table (table 1).  
1.2.1 China – An emerging superpower 
China is interesting for this study due to it being the major power in this region, 
both on an economical level as well as on a political and military. China is an 
authoritarian state with a single-party socialist government. It is the most 
populous nation in the world with north of 1,35 billion citizens. However, even 
though being a de-facto communist regime, the nation has adapted a mainly 
market-based economy, with few enterprises still under state rule. With this blend, 
the Chinese economy has grown like rocket for almost four decades and is today 
estimated to be the second largest economy in the world. Furthermore the vast 
economic growth has made it possible for Chinas leaders to insert a huge amount 
of dominance in its dealings with other nations in the area and has also let the 
communist regime to be able to begin a major modernization program of its 
armed forces. This however, has not come to be without a price. China today is 
the world‟s largest energy consumer and the world‟s largest oil-importer; therefor 
China might look upon the possibility of rich oil-fields in the South China Sea as 
a solution to gain energy-independence (CIA 2, 2014). 
1.2.2 Vietnam – a small state with big ambitions 
Vietnam is as its considerable larger neighbor to the north a single party state with 
a socialist/communist regime. However, it does not hold the same economic or 
political sway as China, but what makes it interesting is that the state is one of the 
newcomers on the oil-producing market and an economical rocket in the stages 
where China was in the mid 1990‟s. This alone makes them a factor in the region. 
Furthermore Vietnam is the state who holds the largest number of islands in the 
South China Sea and does not seem to be as careful of its reputation as other states 
when dealing with what they view as aggression in the region (CIA 3, 2014) 
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1.2.3 The Philippines – A corrupt democracy 
The Philippines stand out as the largest democracy in the region with its 
constitutional republic, although a democracy with vast problems. The Philippines 
is considered a flawed democracy by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU 1, 
2010) and according to Transparency International it currently holds 94
th
 place on 
their corruption perception index (TI 1, 2013), which makes it one of the worst 
democracies or flawed democracies in the world in that category. Corruption aside 
though, the Philippines is a state enjoying good relationships with other states 
around the world, relationships often based on trade. It is one of the founding 
members of ASEAN, and holds heavy political sway over the policy ASEAN-
countries abide by. By this measure the Philippines is viewed by this study as a 
state with a “cleaner reputation”, being a de-facto democracy, making it 
interesting for scrutiny (CIA 4, 2014). 
 
 
1.3 U
NCLOS – Bringer of peace or steppingstone for power 
struggles? 
The aforementioned countries often cite international law and the use of exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZ) when they defend their reasoning in the dispute of the 
Spratly Islands. The international law they are referring to is UNCLOS – the 
United Nations Convention on the Law Of the Sea (III) established in 1982. 
State China Vietnam The Philippines 
Goverment Single-party 
socialist 
Single-party 
socialst 
Constitutional 
democracy 
Population 1,35+Bn 89+M 99+M 
GDP (nominal)  9 182 000Bn 170 020Bn 272 018Bn 
Military 
expenditures 
166,107Bn 3,363Bn 2,977Bn 
Number of 
occupied islands 
7 26 10 
Table 1 – State by state comparison.  
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This convention from the United Nations outlines what rights and what 
responsibilities ratified states have when they make use of the world‟s oceans. 
Although the convention outlines a vast number of issues ranging from trade to 
environmental responsibilities this study will focus on the conventions guidelines 
regarding the exploitation of natural resources. 
The goal of UNCLOS is to help secure peace and cooperation in issues 
regarding the seas and to help draw maritime territorial borders in border disputes. 
Border disputes at sea were and are numerous, probably due to the wide range of 
economic benefits territorial waters might bring to a state. In the treaty it is stated 
that states have sole claim to, and authority over natural resources found within its 
territorial waters. This of course makes it imperative to determine what such 
borders are and how far out from land these borders reach (UN 1, 1982). 
To achieve this UNCLOS is fitted with a range of tools to help determine and 
outline borders between states that have ratified the treaty. However, these tools 
can be tricky, especially in an area such as the Spratly Islands archipelago with its 
current unique ownership situation. 
Article 76 of UNCLOS is a tool used to define the different types of maritime 
zones and is used to create a framework for border drawings. To illustrate why 
this is important for the study and to help the reader understand the mechanics 
behind the dispute a pictographic representation (picture 2) of the different zones 
have been used whilst explaining its different parts below.   
 
Coastal Baseline: The baseline is considered to be the low-water line along the 
coast of a landmass, and forms the “founding boundary” from which territorial 
waters boundaries are drawn. It is measured from the lowest point of visible land 
during low tide. (UN 1, 1982, Part II) 
Territorial Waters: Territorial waters is allowed to extend 22,2km from the 
baseline out to sea, if two or more states territorial waters is to overlap, the border 
is drawn from the mean line between the two states (UN 1, 1982, Part II, Section 
2).  
Picture 2 
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Contiguous Zone: If uncontested, a state may claim a contiguous territorial 
zone another 22,2km from the edge of its normal territorial waters. However, 
there is now mechanism in place to deal with disputes over such contested 
contiguous zones (UN 1, 1982, Art. 33).  
Exclusive Economic Zone: This is where it starts to get hairy, the EZZ is not 
considered territorial waters, as such; no claim can be made for regular territorial 
water such as creating and upholding law or taxes, since it is formally 
international waters. However, the EZZ grants a state exclusive right to what is 
under the sea level, i.e. natural resources. The EZZ normally ranges up to 370km 
out from the coastal baseline (UN 1, 1982, Part V). 
Continental Shelf: To make matters even more complex, states have rights to 
make claims to the seabed, and what may be contained under it, of the continental 
shelf and to the rise and the slope of the continental shelf to a distance of up to 
648km from the coastal baseline. These claims however had to be made to the UN 
by May 2009 (UN 1, 1982, Part VI). 
As stated earlier the South China Sea is basically one gigantic continental 
shelf, thus, if a state were to gain control of the Spratly Islands it would gain hold, 
not only of the islands and its 410 000km
2
 of territorial waters, but also huge 
domains considered EEZ and even larger areas of seabed due to the continental 
shelf, possibly containing trillions of dollars‟ worth of natural resources. This, 
much more than the mostly uninhabitable rocks and reefs of the Spratly Islands, is 
what the disputes are all about.  
With the UNCLOS convention follows also the creation of ITLOS, 
International Tribunal for the Law Of the Sea. This tribunal is the main 
mechanism for resolving disputes arising from the UNCLOS treaty.  
All states within the scope of this study have signed and ratified the UNCLOS 
agreement (UN 1, 1982 , signatories) 
1.4 Research question 
A world in more dire need of natural resources every day and a harsher political 
climate with new emerging economic and military powers is what makes this field 
of study so interesting. As outlined earlier in the above introduction, the potential 
for economic gains among budding economies can make for great contestation of 
territorial claims in potentially resource rich areas such as the South China Sea. 
However, this might also be signs of resurgence towards a kind of disputes not 
seen in abundance during the last decades.  
Since the fall of the Soviet Union much of the peace- and conflict-studies have 
shifted direction, focusing on modern disputes and modern wars much more 
heavily focused on an individual dimension, devoid in many cases of interstate 
dispute and contained within the boundaries of a failing state. Due to this change 
in international climate a need for new theoretical approaches to peace- and 
conflict-studies arose leaving old state-centric approaches somewhat in the rear-
view mirror.  
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However, new technology and rising demand for natural resources has made it 
profitable to exploit areas earlier considered too expensive or unreachable such as 
the South China Sea, or the Arctic. In these instances a state-centric approach is 
probably the only way to understand the conflict since only states have the 
capacity to reach and exploit these areas. Therefor one might wonder, is the 
oceans the new battlefield in state-centric international conflicts? If so, is the 
international community with the UN and liberal economic cooperation 
constructed securely enough to withstand emerging conflicts or will states hunger 
for power sweep these lofty goals aside? To better understand this phenomena this 
study will aim to compare three states actions in the South China Sea within the 
framework of two state-centric approaches. 
 
 With which of the state-centric peace- and conflict-theories – Neorealism 
or Neoliberalism – can one best understand China, Vietnam and the 
Philippines actions in situations regarding inter-state territorial disputes 
in the South China Sea? 
1.5 Disposition 
What you have just read was the introduction, the subject limitations and the main 
research question of the study, immediately following this a presentation of the 
research methodology will be made, including a description of how the empirical 
data was found to make the research cumulative and comparable. With the 
schematic of the empirical data will also follow a construction of a chronological 
timeline of empirical events. Continuing, there will be a presentation of the 
theoretical framework and an operationalization of that framework to narrow 
down which criteria the empirical data will be subject to, followed by a depiction 
of all events in the timeline. Towards the end you will find an analytical approach 
to the events and discussion about the results, rounded off by the conclusions of 
the study, aiming to answer the original research question. 
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2 The virtue of a structured focused 
comparison case study – cumulative and 
comparable results 
The overarching aim of this study was to compare the different mechanics which 
are at work in the conflicts of the South China Sea and in maritime disputes, while 
at the same time testing the value of state-centric theories in a new environment.   
To make this study as scientifically viable as possible the decision was made 
to conduct a process tracing case study from a Structured Focused Comparison 
methodology as explained by Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, rather 
than a more classic case study based either solely on quantitative measures or 
qualitative considerations. The case in this study, of course, is that of dispute of 
the Spratly Islands, but when faced with comparing different actors within the 
scope of a certain theoretical framework during a set period of time, qualitative 
case-studies have the tendency to become far to wide-ranging and speculative, 
which according to George and Bennett limits the scientific value of such a study 
(2005, p. 67 – 70). The use of such a study will in many cases not produce 
satisfactory cumulative or comparable results and therefor the decision was made 
to use a structured focused comparison.  
To overcome these potential scientific roadblocks this case is based on a 
clearly identifiably universe, that of the Spratly Islands, and will identify which 
instances within this universe it aims to research (ibid.). In this case the instances 
researched will be all events during a set period of time, containing inter-state 
actions between Vietnam, China and the Philippines, pertaining to the dispute of 
the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The instances studied will have to take 
place between at least two of the actors or by one actor but significantly impacting 
their relations to one or more of the other parties. The study was formatted this 
way to try and ensure the possibility of triangulation between the actors and their 
choices in each instance.  
This structured focused comparison aims to direct general questions that 
reflect the overlying objective of the research to these instances and then compare 
the results. This way the study ensures cumulative results since the same set of 
questions could be asked to another set of instances chosen with the same criteria 
and produce comparable results (George - Bennett, 2005, p. 67) 
To narrow and focus the study it is important to acknowledge that the study 
should only deal with certain aspects of the instances and not the instances in a 
broader sense. This study will focus on a certain set of neoliberal and neorealist 
markers and use those to question the instances relation to each theoretical 
alignment, in some cases the theoretical markers is fairly easy to comprehend and 
identify within the instances, other are justifiably more complex requiring more of 
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the researchers interpretation. This of course could impact the reliability of the 
study due to the difference of interpretations between the researcher and the 
reader (George – Bennett, 2005, p. 89 – 90). With this in mind the study has 
aimed to operationalize the theoretical framework to a very small set of variables, 
attempting to ensure a more comprehensive link between theory and empirical 
data. It may sound unjustifiably narrow; however, an attempt to broaden the scope 
of a case-study such as this carries with it an ever ending set of new problems. 
With every new inquiry, for example non-state actor events in the instances would 
need its own set of theoretical framework and criteria. Keeping a case-study 
focused and selective is imperative to be able to test the theories the study is using 
as its baseline. Furthermore these aspects and these questions need to be applied 
equally to all of the instances to produce scientifically viable results (George – 
Bennett, 2005, p. 112).  
After testing the aforementioned theoretical markers on the empirical 
instances considerations will be made weather or not the actors can best be 
described with either neorealist variables or neoliberal variables thus answering 
the research question. 
This study also aims towards helping to yield useful knowledge of an 
important field of study within international relations. Hopefully it can be used 
both as a new way to view the conflict of the Spratly Islands and the field of 
interstate maritime conflicts as a whole. Furthermore it aims to bring new light to 
why a state-centric approach to peace-conflict-studies is not out of date.  
2.1 Finding empirical data 
When finding empirical data for the study several factors came into play. The 
empirical data had to be found within a limited timeframe, both to limit the shear 
amount of data but also to keep the data relatively fresh since one of the aims of 
the study is to show usage of state-centric conflict-theories in modern inter-state 
relations.   
Furthermore the data had to be readily available, which proved a significant 
challenge when dealing with instances where negotiations had been held since 
very little material from these negotiations have been made available to the 
public. One must also consider the possibility that much interaction between the 
actors in all aspects have not caught the public eye and is therefore not 
identifiable. 
To find the data several different methods were used in hopes to find as a 
complete amount of the significant data as possible. To find information on 
bi/multi-lateral agreements the United Nations Treaty Collection was used since it 
contains all agreed to contracts between states and/or organizations. EBSCO 
databases were used to find scientific journal publications regarding the subject 
matter and news articles were used to together with UNTC establish instances. 
Since all these sources except UNTC will be of a secondary nature, they must be 
made subject to an appropriate amount of source criticism.   
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Problems did arise though since a significant language barrier exists. The 
research will have limitations to Swedish and English language material, whilst 
researching a phenomena in a part of the world where none of these are main 
languages thus significantly limiting the empirical data. These limitations is not 
only impacting the amount of data but might also impact validity, since much of 
the material will be secondary source material from mass-media, sometimes 
translated from another language. This translation could possibly affect the 
contents due in large parts to limitations in compatibility between the languages, 
missing some of the underlying meanings in a translation.   
2.1.1 The creation of a timeline 
To create the timeline of instances and limit the amount of data the study had to 
process, several different sources were utilized. General searches over longer 
time-periods were made in databases such as; UNTC, EBSCO, and mass media to 
find events transpiring between the actors. By combining the searches and 
filtering out all material not pertinent to the scope of the study a total number of 
events could be identified. Search parameters were then slowly narrowed until a 
manageable number of results were found. The search parameters were all 
narrowed in the same way and with the same timeframe as to not create a 
statistical bias and observational errors in what material should be chosen.   
2.2 Weighing the events 
After examining the instance and identifying what theoretical variables best suited 
for the situation there is another matter which needs to be taken into consideration 
– weighing the result. Since actions taken by the principle parties in one of the 
instances will to a varying degree be sorted under neorealism or neoliberalism 
considerations has to be made to how much of gravity that particular event is 
worth to the theoretical alignment. For example, a pure military engagement 
between two parties shelling each other with cannons should obviously carry a 
heavier alignment towards neorealist theory, than issuing a threat of military 
force. 
Due to the very limited scope of this study and the short time-frame in which 
the research is made the initial considerations of weighing the data had to be 
altered. At first the intention was to add a codified set of alphanumerical values 
ranging from 1 – 10 and then assign each instance a value for neorealism and one 
for liberalism. These alphanumerical values would then be put into a matrix, 
allowing the reader o in a structured way to follow patterns and easily 
summarizing the results to a mean value.  
This however would prove too daunting for a study this size and even though 
it might somewhat negatively impact the study‟s cumulativity the weighing will 
instead be done directly in the analysis by the researcher. This also presents 
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challenges to avoid preconceptions on the researchers‟ part when weighing the 
evidentiary material since political bias could impact the analysis (George – 
Bennett, 2005, pp. 102). Hopes are that with this clear in mind the analysis will be 
done as unbiased as possible. 
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3 A state-centric theoretical framework 
Due to this study‟s basis in inter-state rather than intra-state disputes, 
considerations were made to solidify the research in state-centric approaches. The 
foundation of the theoretical framework will be built upon two major peace- and 
conflict-studies theories; the neorealist school of thought sprouting from mainly 
Kenneth Waltz, and the neoliberalist school of thought popularized by Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye.  
Both schools keep the focus on the anarchic state order but takes different 
approaches to how states act within this order and what mechanisms drive them to 
do so. To operationalize the theories several key-elements of each theory, relating 
to dealings between state actors in dispute situations will be identified and used as 
variables when further examining the instances of the study-universe. 
In an effort to keep this study as modern and scientifically viable as possible, 
the theoretical framework variables has not solely been adapted from the founders 
of each genre, but also from its progression amongst more modern scholars who 
has continuously developed the theories.  
3.1 Neorealism  
The first theoretical framework chosen for this study is that of neorealism. 
Neorealism must be said to be a deductive theory based on drawing logical 
conclusions. The basis for this theoretical framework in this study will mainly 
derive from the Kenneth Waltz school of thought.  
As stated above both the theory is based upon states as the principle actors and 
the belief that states exist in an anarchic organizational principle, devoid of 
overstate powers or global governance (Waltz, 1979, 88-89). Being a state in this 
anarchic world order you act after certain variables and the main purpose in this 
chapter is to identify what this variables are.  
Neorealists believe that in an anarchic society, each actor (state) has no other 
choice but than to look after themselves since other states are seen as competitors 
and therefore cannot be trusted (Waltz, 1979, p. 105). The overarching goal of 
each state is as Mercheimer describes it, at least to survive and at most to achieve 
hegemony. To achieve its goals state actors look to state capabilities. 
State capabilities are based on five considerations. (Mearshiemer, 2001, 72 – 
73) 
 Access to natural resources – a dependence on other states for natural 
resources will put military power at risk. 
 Economic Strength – money is power. 
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 Demographic numbers - the larger populous the easier to build and 
maintain armed forces. 
 Technological advancements – High achievements in technology will 
increase the relative power of each military unit. 
 Military strength – The bigger the stick the more others will fear you. 
 
Of course this chart of capabilities will have different values in each state, 
which will create what neorealists call, a relative capability of each state. The 
difference in relative capability is closely tied to what is known as the security 
dilemma.  
The security dilemma is understood as when one actor gains a higher relative 
capability; the other actors fear this development and seek to further their own 
capability in order to assure survival. This in turn would again force the first party 
to strengthen their capabilities and so on and so forth in a never-ending spiral. 
However, there is some discrepancy here depending on which neorealist you ask. 
A defensive structure realist such as Waltz, would argue that there is a way to 
escape the security dilemma, since each state is seeking security, rather than 
power; there is an opening for states to seek alliances with stronger states and in 
this way ensuring its security (1979, pp. 126). Offensive realists such as 
Mearshiemer however, believe that states does not seek security but are inherently 
aggressive and seek power and hegemony thus eliminating any other chance of 
escaping the security dilemma. Therefor the study will only categorize this as 
strengthening capabilities. (2001, ch. 2) 
The neorealist way of seeking relative gains can be described as a zero-sum 
game i.e. if one actor gains something the other actor/actors loses the same 
amount thus keeping the sum of the game at a constant zero (Waltz, 1979, p 70). 
This might be one of the least complex marker of identifying neorealist action; if a 
military force from state A lands on an island claimed by both A and state B, state 
B is put in a losing position. State B loses the island, state A gains the island. 
Furthermore if state B is in a position of power, outweighing the relative 
capabilities of state A, state B might be able to regain the island with the threat of 
annihilating state A forces, if state A sees this as a possibility it might withdraw 
its forces without bloodshed. Therefor both military action and threat of military 
action must be seen as key variables to the neorealist framework. 
3.2 Neoliberalism 
Just like with neorealism, neoliberal theory has its starting point in a state-centric 
anarchic world structure and can be seen as both deductive and positivistic in 
nature (Nye, 1988, p. 238). However, where neorealists see competition the 
neoliberalists see cooperation. Subsequently, the neoliberalist theory will have 
diametrical point of considerations from the neorealist. Therefore this study aims 
to distinguish the key variables in neoliberalist theory to use as the second 
theoretical framework for the empirical studies. Neorealism has its basis in 
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economical political theory but it has been adapted by most notably Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye to suit the international relations theory.  
The neoliberalist theory approaches the idea of anarchic world order as a 
catalyst for cooperation between states. State-actors are in neoliberalist ideas 
seeking rational choice rather than relative gains (Keohane, 1989, p. 39) in what 
could best be described as a positive-sum seeking game theory 
In a positive-sum game actors chose middle grounds to further all of the actors 
rather than to be on a standstill. The approach must be seen as rather altruistic to 
some extent since the gains for actor A could be significantly higher than the 
gains for actor B without there being any problems as long as there are gains for 
both. This sort of behavior is most easily accessible in bi-lateral or multi-lateral 
agreements on relying efficiency of institutions and cooperation to seek security 
(Kay, 2006, 74). Furthermore cooperation brings with it not only wealth but a 
more tightly knit bond between the actors. A tighter bond means greater risk for 
loss if engaged in aggressive behavior which to a rational actor would mean that 
bi-lateral agreements strengthen peace. 
Another pillar of neoliberalist theory is that of the democratic peace. The 
concept of democratic peace is that since no two actors that have been full-fledged 
democracy has ever been at war with each other; democracy can serve as a 
cornerstone for peace. Therefore neoliberal theory has taken to promote 
democracy and democratic reforms as a way to ensure peace, security and 
cooperation (Keohane, 1989, p. 15 – 24). With this in mind, the instances 
regarding the Philippines in this study will be highly interesting since it may give 
clue weather or not a flawed democracy will act as a propellant for peace or not. 
Furthermore, neoliberals as mentioned earlier have their basis in an economical 
political theory, and as such they draws a clear correlation between a wealthier 
middle-class of a state‟s populous with the increased chance for a democratic 
government. To further this extent, neoliberalism can also be seen promoting 
economic reform.     
3.3 Operational framework 
Neorealism Neoliberalism 
Mistrust in other states Positive-sum seeking 
Seeking relative gains and 
thus by assuring long-term 
survival  
Tying together states through 
bi/multilateral agreements to 
increase cost of aggression 
Military posturing (threats and 
unexplained claims) 
Promoting economic reform 
Use of military force Seeking institutional 
efficiency through cooperation 
Strengthening capabilities due 
to perceived security dilemma 
Promoting democratic peace 
Table 2 
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Above has been mentioned and explained several of the key-mechanics in each 
theory. To make the variables more comprehensible, the theoretical framework 
will operate from this schematic: 
These variables will be used as questions to each instance in the timeline and 
then considerations will be made on each instance to try and determine the 
different actors‟ theoretical alignment in each instance. 
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4 A half-decade of blossoming 
disputes 
As mentioned several times in the study the scope of the research is by necessity 
very limited, therefore so is the number of instances the study will be able to 
examine. The limitations on instances was after careful consideration set on 
fifteen as to not gain to much empirical data since this would severely impact the 
depth of analysis possible for each instance. However, reducing the timeframe 
drastically revealed a total of thirteen instances in for the 5 year timeline between 
01-05-2009 and 01-05-2014. Thirteen is close enough to the fifteen mark and 
hopes are that fewer instances will gain more qualitative results even though it 
might be lacking in ability to form patterns on how the actors have progressed 
over time.  
During the time-period all events not linked to state-centric actors such as 
military, diplomatic or governmental has been sorted out, this since the study only 
covers state centric theoretical framework. For example such events as civil 
protests against embassies etc. will not be covered by the study, neither will any 
action not taking place within the boundaries of the Spratly Islands or directly 
relating to dispute of the Spratly Islands.  
4.1 Timeline 
The timeline was constructed by first searching the UNTC, with 1994 and 
forward as a baseline, all treaties submitted by either three states or by ASEAN. 
Further research was then conducted in „Google news search‟ to find material of 
interest. Search was constructed on the same basis as in UNTC with all news 
articles from 1994 and forthwith containing any combination of the words Spratly 
Islands, South China Sea, Vietnam, China, Philippines and ASEAN. The search 
was also filtered to what must be considered reputable news-sources. First 
searches was made on a dozen English-speaking newspapers in the South China 
Sea region, however the results were far too numerous with many containing only 
bits and pieces of information regarding actual events taking place. Therefore 
changes were made to five larger news-publications in English but not only in the 
region, hoping these would only contain actual events, BBC, CNN, The New 
York Times, Washington Post, Bangkok Times, The Japan Times and the 
Vietnamese info.vn. A manageable number of articles were found, screened and 
sorted. Still the timeline was far too wide-ranging and limitations in time were 
made to five years instead of twenty. Doing this reduced the number of articles by 
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more than two thirds and after sorting out the „doublets‟ a total of thirteen 
individual events were left and thus formed the basis of the following instances 
timeline.  
 
Date Actors Event Description 
8/05/2009 V + (C) Vietnam makes claims on parts of 
the Spratly Island five days before 
deadline-day for UN considerations 
of extended EEZ‟s. China calls the 
claim illegal and invalid. 
25/02/2011 C + P Chinese Navy frigate opens fires on 
Philippine fishing boats.  
29/03/2011 – 
23/05/2011 
P + C A Philippine oil-exploration vessel is 
harassed by Chinese naval forces in 
march, in may the Philippines lodges 
a formal protest to ITLOS. 
26/05/2011 V + C A Vietnamese oil-exploration ship 
gets its survey-cables cut by Chinese 
patrol vessels.  
09/06/2011 V + C Same MO – Vietnamese 
spokesperson makes harsh statement 
about  China. 
11/10/2011 V + C Vietnam and China agrees to a new 
set of principles when settling 
maritime disputes. 
21/06/2012 V Vietnam passes a law that asserts the 
claims to The Spratly Islands.  
13/07/2012 C China makes an announcement 
stating willingness to reopen 
discussion on code of conduct in the 
South China Sea. 
22/07/2012 C + V 
+ P 
China establish a formal garrison on 
an island in the South China Sea and 
gives it administrative control over 
the Spratly Islands. 
05/09/2012 P The Philippines signed a decree 
renaming the area around The 
Spratly Islands The West Philippine 
Sea. 
22/01/2013 P + C Philippines submit a new case to 
ITLOS seeking clarification on the 
Chinese nine-segment line on the 
South china Sea validity. 
10/01/2014  C China imposes new rules on fishing 
permits in the South China Sea. 
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11/03/2014 C + P Chinese naval vessels forces two 
Philippine re-supply ships to turn 
around in the Spratly Islands. 
         Table 3 
4.2 Description of empirical instances 
Below will follow a more detail description of each instance in the timeline. 
Analysis will follow in the next chapter and hold the same outline as the 
descriptive part. This separation has been made to make it easier for the reader to 
distinguish between empirical data and research analysis. The instances will be 
referred to by their date in the following descriptive section and further down in 
the analysis.   
8/05/2009 – 13th of May, 2009 was the last day for states to submit their 
extended EEZ claims to the UNCLOS Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS). Malaysia and Vietnam co-submitted during this time a 
claim of areas in the South China Sea in the archipelago that is The Spratly 
Islands. Even though the submittal was done bi-lateral with Malaysia the claims 
were separate and this study will treat this instance only to Vietnam instance. The 
Vietnam delegation stated during the verbal presentation to the commission that 
the areas they were claiming were also claimed by other nation and that Chinas 
claim over the area did not carry any legal, historical or factual basis. (CLCS64, 
2009, p. 19-20). The commission stated that considerations to the claim would be 
made, and that further developments in the area would be taken into consideration 
if such were to occur (ibid.). 
Chinese reaction to this claim was livid and a spokesman for the Chines 
Foreign Ministry stated that China had sole sovereignty over the disputed area and 
urged the CLCS to ignore the Vietnamese claim which he called illegal and 
invalid (BBC 1, 2009). 
25/02/2011 – Philippine officials claimed that three Philippine fishing boats in 
Spratly Island waters had been fired upon by Chinese maritime forces. The 
Chinese frigate Dongguan was said to be the perpetrator (Washington Times 1). It 
is also claimed that the Philippine fishing boats were warned to leave Chinese 
territorial waters before being fired upon (Thayer, 2011, p. 5 - 6). 
--/03/2011 – 23/05/2011 – Philippine president Aquino stated that an arms 
race in the South China Sea was a real possibility due to the many clashes 
between South China Sea states vessels and he warned Chinese officials that with 
continuation of harassment that such an arms race would certainly heighten the 
potential of an armed conflict. The statement came two months after a Philippine 
oil-exploration vessel was harassed by Chinese forces in Spratly Island waters. 
Subsequently The Philippines also issued a formal protest with the ITLOS 
although not a case-submission (Bangkok Post 1, 2012).  
26/05/2011 – Vietnam also had a dispute regarding oil-exploration ships with 
China at the same time. Vietnam accused China for deliberately cutting the 
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exploration-ship‟s survey cables by running them over with a patrol boat in high 
speed when the cables were still close to the surface (BBC 2, 2011).  
A spokesperson for the Vietnam foreign minister later stated that Vietnam 
would do everything in its power to protect territorial rights and the sovereignty of 
Vietnam, stating that the Vietnamese navy would be tasked with the job. Chinese 
officials from the foreign ministry responded by blaming Vietnam, and claiming 
infringement on China‟s interests and lawful right to its resources by prospecting 
for oil and gas in the region (ibid.). 
09/06/2011 – Only weeks after the previous incident regarding a Vietnamese 
oil-exploration vessel another ship was exposed to the same treatment. The same 
method of running the cable was used but this time under pretense that they got 
caught in the cables while fishing and had to cut the cables. Vietnamese officials 
reacted strongly to this, and accused China for trying to turn undisputed 
Vietnamese territory to disputed claims (info.vn, 2011).  
11/10/2011 – This instance is a treaty between Vietnam and China. The 
agreement outlines new basic principles to guide the settlement of maritime issues 
between the two socialist states (Boundary news 1, 2011).  
The treaty outlines that satisfactory and peaceful settlement of maritime issues 
between the two states is in both countries best interest, and should be based on; a 
mutual stability and stride towards peace, cooperation and development. 
Furthermore the treaty states that the two countries should build resolve their 
issues with future-oriented relations in mind and build up a good neighborly 
partnership.  It further reads that periodic meetings between the heads of 
government in the two states shall be held on a regular basis for border 
negotiations and that cooperation also shall be promoted in less disputed fields 
such as science and natural disaster relief (UNTC I-49625). 
21/06/2012 - Just over half a year after the declaration of territorial border 
resolution between China and Vietnam, the later passes a law outright claiming 
possession over the Spratly and the Parcel islands. This had a strongly negative 
ring to it when listening with Chinese ears. The Chinese Foreign Ministry 
summoned the Vietnamese ambassador in Beijing and protested the law followed 
by harsh condemnations to the media by a ministry spokesperson (New York 
Times 1, 2012).  
13/07/2012 – China states that it wishes for new multilateral agreements 
between the ASEAN countries and China on the Code of Conduct in the South 
China Sea, hoping to formalize an agreement before November and the yearly 
ASEAN summit (Reuters 1). They also calls for all the nations in the region to 
exercise self-restraint to not escalate the tense situation (China Daily 1, 2012). 
22/07/2012 – China follows its wish for a code of conduct by formalizing the 
administrative jurisdiction of its possessions in the South China Sea by formally 
establishing a garrison in the region and giving it city status. China stated that the 
move was made to support local emergency and disaster relief as well as carrying 
out military mission (Reuters 2. 2012). This move was highly criticized as a way 
to raise tensions in the region even higher by both Vietnam and The Philippines. 
Vietnam called it a serious violation of their sovereignty and the president of the 
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Philippines later went so far as to say that his country would never back down 
from a territorial dispute with China (Global Security 1, 2012).  
Furthermore the president made this statement during an address to the nation 
and followed it by announcing the procurement of over 40 military aircrafts with 
delivery dates over the following two years to strengthen the Philippine defense 
(ibid.).  
05/09/2012 – A presidential decree is made from Philippine president Aquino 
proclaiming that the EEZ belonging to the Philippines and incorporating 
Philippine claims of the Spratly Islands to no longer be called South China Sea 
but rather The West Philippine Sea. By doing so he effectively shown that the 
Philippines consider this territory to be within their full legal jurisdiction 
(Philippine Gov. Ad/29 s2012).  
22/01/2013 – Philippines elevate the dispute over the Spratly Islands to the 
UN level by filing an official case with the ITLOS over the contested area. The 
main objective is to get the tribunal to declare the Chinese nine-segment line on 
the South China Sea as invalid. The Philippine notification states that the Chinese 
claim is as far as 1600km from the nearest Chinese coast making their claim 
invalid in accordance with the 1982 UNCLOS agreement. Furthermore The 
Philippines wishes for the tribunal to clearly acknowledge the full jurisdiction of 
the Philippines to their claims in the Spratly Islands as well as acknowledge 
China‟s unlawful actions in establishing a provincial government in an area not 
recognized by international law as sovereign Chinese territories and their 
subsequent expulsion of maritime vessels on wrongful grounds (Philippine 
Department of Foreign Affairs No. 13-0211).  
10/01/2014 – The provincial government in the South China Sea established in 
2012 takes new fishery laws in to affect in the South China Sea. The new laws 
that are Chinese national laws as of 2004, strongly limits the fishery industry 
without permits from the Chinese government. It also states that foreign vessels 
needs to be issued permits by the appropriate Chinese authorities to be allowed to 
exercise large scale fishing in provincial waters (PRC 2004). Since the Chinese 
government treat everything within their nine- segment line as provincial waters it 
gives itself the right to expel any foreign fishing vessel who enters the areas 
around the Spratly Islands. However, even though the new laws severely limits 
foreign involvement it also sets limitations on the entire fishing industry. These 
limitations can be said to be in accordance with other provisions in the UNCLOS 
treaty on preserving ocean environment (Fravel, 2014).  
11/03/2014 – China expelled two Philippine ships on their way to re-provision 
a Philippine warship grounded on a reef within the Spratly Islands in 1999. 
Chinese officials commented on the expulsion with a statement that China had full 
rights over its sovereign territory of the Spratly Islands (Global Times 1, 2014). 
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5 Analyzing the data within the 
theoretical framework 
Analysis the empirical data will be done in a two-step process, firstly the data will 
be tested towards the theoretical framework outlined earlier in the study and each 
instance will be judge on the theoretical variables and finally classified as to what 
if any theoretical alignment it holds. These results will then be listed compared 
and discussed. 
5.1 Chronological instance-analysis 
The instance-analysis will be made with the same structure as the instance-
descriptions above. This time descriptions will not be made about the event but 
rather a straight interpretation of the events in relation to the theoretical questions 
found at chapter 3.3, and an attempt to decipher each instances theoretical 
alignment. 
13/05/2009 – In this instance much of the theoretical markers of Neoliberalism 
could be found at a first glance, but underneath the surface a more complex 
situation emerges. Vietnam uses a multi-lateral agreement (UNCLOS) to take its 
claims and doing so bi-laterally, possibly seeking strength in numbers to 
overcome Chinese dominance and possibly to have an economic partner when 
taking control over the resource rich area. These are all factors of Neoliberalist 
theory. However, Vietnam uses harsh language and the fact that they accepted the 
partnership of Malaysia could be seen as strengthening military capabilities in a 
perceived security dilemma.  
China postures wildly in this instance using master suppression techniques in 
dismissing the Vietnam claim. Both nations show great mistrust in each other. 
Although factors weighing in on both alignments for Vietnam this instance must 
be seen as slightly more neoliberal from their side while China take a slight 
neorealist standpoint. 
25/02/2011 – This instance hold clear-cut neorealist alignment for China since 
they took to the use of military force. The Philippines condemned the attack but 
cannot be judged to hold any theoretical alignment. 
29/03/2011 – 23/05/2011 – The Philippines takes to warning the Chinese, 
clearly taking on a threatening posture even though the rhetoric can be seen as an 
open hand to cooperation in deescalating tensions and merely a warning that a 
security dilemma might arise. Furthermore the Philippines turn to a multi-lateral 
  22 
agreement to resolve the dispute by issuing a protest to ITLOS. These combined 
efforts of peaceful de-escalation should be seen as neoliberal from their side.  
Chinese involvement in this instance is clearly neorealist with military 
posturing to the extent of driving off a perceived enemy.  
26/05/2011 – The first of Vietnam‟s oil-exploration vessels twin encounter 
with Chinese maritime forces also holds more neorealist variables mainly due to 
strong military posturing after the incidents by Vietnamese officials but also to a 
certain extent of trying to strengthen its capabilities by gaining economic and 
natural resource benefits. China also holds neorealist sway in this instance, both 
by using a form of force when cutting the cables and also by clearly playing a 
zero-sum game when acting to increase relative gains (less Vietnamese oil-
exploitation would mean more Chinese).  
09/06/2011 – The second instance of this twin-event cannot in any way have 
an altered theoretical alignment. Same attempts to strengthen capabilities and 
seeking relative gains. Neorealist – neorealist. 
11/10/2011 – A treaty based instance such as this holds many neoliberal 
values. The treaty agreed to by China and Vietnam holds almost all of the 
neoliberal markers. It is an attempt to tie together the states closer to each other, 
increasing the cost of aggression; it seeks economic cooperation and economic 
reform due to its basis in economic benefits for the populace of both nations. 
Clearly this is a positive-sum seeking agreement and as such a clear neoliberal 
theoretical alignment for both nations.  
21/06/2012 – Vietnam passing this law should probably be considered a 
neorealist posture. However, the Chinese response is a bit trickier. China 
denounces the neorealist posture by diplomatic means instead of making a posture 
of its own. This action is, if not neoliberalist according to the study‟s operational 
framework, at least negatively devoid of neorealist mechanics. Therefor China in 
this instance will be considered neutral. 
13/07/2012 – Another instance where China calls for multi-lateral cooperation 
and interstate instances for solving disputes. This has to be considered 
neoliberalist in the scope of this study. Even though China might have had 
underlying motives for their reasoning no neorealist markers can be applied to the 
event therefore China remains squarely in the neoliberal alignment in this 
instance. 
22/07/2012 – Strong military posturing, seeking relative gains and 
strengthening its capabilities to act in the region China is with the establishment 
of a garrison and administrative center in the area clearly aligned in the neorealist 
corner within the framework of this study. It is also strengthening its military 
capabilities be advancing its positions, shortening the distance between the 
disputed area and its military. Philippines can also be seen as slightly on the 
neorealist scales with threatening military retaliation between the lines and 
severely mistrusting the other nation. Small concessions is made on Chinas part to 
seem less threatening by claiming it is a move towards tying the region together 
increasing efficiency in disaster relief operations benefiting the entire region.  
05/09/2012 – The Philippines shows in this instance a clear mistrust in the 
other states when trying to solidify their grasp on the claim. They are also 
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posturing and showing that they will hold their own. Furthermore it is clearly 
strengthening its capabilities with the announcement of modernizing parts of the 
military. Clearly they act in a zero-sum seeking and neorealist manner.  
22/01/2013 – This instance is once again showing The Philippines desire to 
solve this matter on a level that lay beyond inter-state actions. They try to seek 
solutions through multilateral-agreements both they and China have signed and 
ratified. This action should be seen as neoliberal. However, they have a clear 
mistrust in China and one could also argue that they seek to strengthen their own 
capabilities by trying to convince the tribunal to rule the ownership of The Spratly 
Islands in their favor. These underlying causes forces The Philippines further to 
the middle between the two theoretical alignments and all in all they should in this 
instance be viewed as neutral to slightly neoliberalist. 
10/01/2014 – The Chinese fishery laws are in clear violation of the UNCLOS 
treaty and can only be seen as a way to seek relative gains by China. Squarely 
putting the region under Chinese law is also increasing Chinese capabilities and 
therefor no other conclusion can be drawn other than that China is acting in 
accordance with the neorealist framework of this study.  
11/03/2014 – The subsequent expulsion of Philippines vessels and the military 
posturing that followed must again put China in the neorealist corner. The 
Philippines will in this instance join them in that corner since the ships expelled 
were on their way to resupply a military vessel in the disputed waters.  
5.2 Discussing and weighing the data 
To be able to more easily comprehend the analysis above the following table will 
show each instance and each actor‟s theoretical alignment in that instance. The 
weighing as stated earlier has been made solely by the researcher limiting the 
cumulativity of the study but also narrowing the time and space needed for 
analysis.  
 
Instance China Vietnam The 
Philippines 
08/05/2009 Neorealist Neoliberal - 
25/02/2011 Neorealist - Neutral 
29/03/2011 
– 
23/05/2011 
Neorealist - Neoliberal 
26/05/2011 Neorealist Neorealist - 
09/06/2011 Neorealist Neorealist - 
11/10/2011 Neoliberal Neoliberal - 
21/06/2012 Neutral Neorealist - 
13/07/2012 Neoliberal - - 
22/07/2012 Neorealist - Neorealist 
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05/09/2012 Neorealist  Neorealist 
22/01/2013 - - Neutral – 
Neoliberal 
10/01/2014 Neorealist - - 
11/03/2014 Neorealist - Neorealist 
             Table 4 
This table exposes some rather interesting points, firstly it shows that China was 
an active participation in almost all of the instances while Vietnam and The 
Philippines had active roles in roughly half of the instances. This could be 
interpreted as a sign that China plays a larger and more active role in the region 
which would be in line with the background of China as an emerging superpower.  
Furthermore the analysis points toward a staggering overrepresentation of 
neorealist markers over the last five years. In the case of China neorealist 
alignment was shown in 8 out of 13 instances where the Chinese played an active 
role, that is a neorealist representation in 72% of the cases, while Vietnam shows 
a neorealist alignment in 60% of their cases and The Philippine equivalent is 50%. 
Arguments can be made both for this being a result of governments, with the 
democracy in the bunch showing neorealist alignment in a lesser extent then the 
two one-party regimes, or in terms of military expenditure where the state who 
has the lowest military expenditures also have the lowest number of instances 
with neorealist alignment and vice versa.  
A more interesting revelation is that of the actor with the most occupied 
islands in the Spratly archipelago, Vietnam, is the state who plays a role in the 
least amount of instances during the examined time period. The same can be said 
for the other way round since China is the state with least amount of occupied 
islands but the actor who takes okays the largest role during the period.  
When examining the neoliberal alignments one might be shocked by the very 
abysmal role they seem to have played in the region during the five-year period. 
Not only in the sense that very few of the instances has had actors with neoliberal 
alignments but also since the weight of these alignments has not been nearly as 
heavily gravitated towards its alignment as most of the neorealist alignments. 
However, it should be kept in mind that many of the more significant multi-
lateral agreements such as the UNCLOS and the ASEAN used as cornerstones of 
the study and were signed before the scope in which this study operates.  
Moreover the UNCLOS agreement can after considering the basis of dispute 
in most of the instances be called into question as a positive neoliberal agreement 
for peace and cooperation since much of the disputes stem from its rules regarding 
EEZ and continental shelves.  
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6 Conclusions 
Even with the limited amount of instances in this structured focused comparison, 
clear representations of what international relations theoretical alignments were 
most readily present in the inter-state relations of The Spratly Islands could be 
seen. Although the scope of the enquiry could have been far wider in a larger 
study, presenting more decisive and cumulative results the staggering 
overrepresentation of neorealist alignment from the examined actors in the region 
cannot be seen as an illusion create by limited data. 
The limited scope of this study might have contributed to the lopsided result, 
but clashes over South China Sea riches continues all over the region, between all 
actors, most recently in huge water fights between Vietnamese and Chinese naval 
vessels, tells the same story – interstate territorial disputes in this region is not yet 
resolved by multi-lateral agreements such as UNCLOS. 
Moreover the UNCLOS treaty could be seen, not as the bringer of order it was 
meant to be but rather a catalyst for inter-state territorial squabbles, made possible 
by a loosely defined judicial framework in the treaty. There is of course the 
possibility that the problems arising because of the treaty could be seen only as 
childhood diseases and will be resolved by themselves before very long. 
However, there is the much more frightening possibility of this only being the 
beginning of a decades long struggle between expansionistic states which won‟t 
be resolved until every little island, islet, reef and shoal on the planet is submitted 
to the ITLOS and tried judicially.  
To conclude, a wider and more far-reaching study conducted in this manner 
would most certainly carry with it more scientifically valuable results. However, 
the study should still be considered fairly cumulative in the way that if someone 
wanted to redo this study using the same means the results would probably be 
within the margin of errors. A more substantial system for weighing the impact of  
the theoretical framework on the empirical data would most certainly have 
contributed to cumulativity.  
In essence, the general research objective was reached and the research 
question could be answered with: The neorealist theory should be considered as 
the peace- and conflict-theory that one should use to better understand state-actors 
actions in inter-state territorial disputes in the South China Sea.  
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